The Trade-FDI Nexus: Evidence from the European Union by Martínez San Román, Valeriano et al.
 
 
The Trade-FDI Nexus: Evidence from 
the European Union 
Valeriano Martínez-San Román 
Marta Bengoa-Calvo 
Blanca Sánchez-Robles Rute 
 







































The Trade-FDI Nexus: Evidence from the European Union 
Valeriano Martínez-San Román 
Universidad de Cantabria 
valeriano.martinez@unican.es 
Marta Bengoa-Calvo 
City College of New York (CUNY) 
Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies 
mbengoa@ccny.cuny.edu 
 
2013 / 15 
Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between international 
trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) empirically. It analyses whether the 
reduction of trade barriers over time has increased FDI for the particular case of 
the European Union (EU) during the period from 1995 to 2009. To analyze this 
issue the authors estimate in first place the European Border Effect by means of a 
gravity equation. Once the border effect is obtained we test whether there is a 
positive (complementary) or negative (substitution) relationship between this 
border effect and the FDI within the European countries. A gravity model for 
trade and FDI is estimated using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. The 
results suggest that there is a positive and decreasing border effect up to 2007 
while it turns upward for 2008 and 2009, offsetting the previous decline. For the 
particular case of the EU, commercial integration and FDI reinforce each other, 
thus being complements rather than substitutes. In addition to trade integration 
measures, this paper also analyzes the potential role of other traditional 
determinants of FDI, as the market size of the host country and the cost 
differential among home-host economies. Cost differentials are not as relevant as 
the possibility of gaining market share which leads us to conclude that in the EU 
the FDI pattern follows a market-seeking strategy rather than a cost-efficient 
model. 
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The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between international trade 
and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) empirically. It analyses whether the reduction of 
trade barriers over time has increased FDI for the particular case of the European 
Union (EU) during the period from 1995 to 2009. To analyze this issue the authors 
estimate in first place the European Border Effect by means of a gravity equation. 
Once the border effect is obtained we test whether there is a positive 
(complementary) or negative (substitution) relationship between this border effect 
and the FDI within the European countries. A gravity model for trade and FDI is 
estimated using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. The results suggest that 
there is a positive and decreasing border effect up to 2007 while it turns upward for 
2008 and 2009, offsetting the previous decline. For the particular case of the EU, 
commercial integration and FDI reinforce each other, thus being complements rather 
than substitutes. In addition to trade integration measures, this paper also analyzes 
the potential role of other traditional determinants of FDI, as the market size of the 
host country and the cost differential among home-host economies. Cost differentials 
are not as relevant as the possibility of gaining market share which leads us to 
conclude that in the EU the FDI pattern follows a market-seeking strategy rather than 
a cost-efficient model. 
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The opening decade of the 21st century has witnessed a remarkable increase of 
flows between countries, both in terms of trade and of investment. A favourable 
economic climate during the first part of the decade and a widespread trend among 
firms towards the geographical reorganization of production have been some of the 
reasons underlying this pattern. 
Not surprisingly, the global stock of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI  
mounted from US$ 7.5 trillion in 2000 to US$ 19 trillion in 2010, its share in world 
GDP rising from 23% in 2000 to over 31% in 2010. In turn, trade in goods and 
services has grown from US$ 16 trillion in 2000 to over US$ 37 trillion in 2010. The 
ratio world trade to GDP has increased 10 percentage points (from 49% in 2000 to 
59%) during the first decade of the 21st century (UNCTAD, 2010a, 2011a). 
The financial and economic crisis of the second half of the decade, however, has 
induced a turning point in the upward trend of trade and FDI. Thus, inward FDI flows 
fell 15% in 2008, 37% in 2009 and increased only by a modest 5% in 2010.  The total 
amount of FDI inflows was 37% lower in 2010 than in 2007. (UNCTAD, 2010b, 
2011b) 
Trade has also decreased during the economic crisis. After a significant 
slowdown in 2008, the volume of world trade dropped by over 13% in 2009, this fall 
representing its greatest decline since World War II. However, the volume of world 
merchandise trade registered a 14 per cent increase in 2010, which roughly offset its 
decline in 2009. 
The expansion in international trading and investment activities has coincided 
over  time with an increase  in the number of  Regional Economic Integration 
Agreements (RIAs) and with a further deepening in the removal of restrictions on 
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factor movements. For the particular case of the European Union –and in addition to 
the 1992 Single European Act, which  fully liberalized the internal mobility of goods, 
services, capital and people, and an extension in  1995–  other important landmarks 
in the 21st century  have been the implementation of the single currency in 2002 and 
subsequent enlargements in 2004 and 2007. 
This paper focuses on two particular aspects of the integration process of the 
European economy. First, it analyses to what extent the institutional steps mentioned 
above correspond in effect to a more integrated over time EU, as far as trade is 
concerned. For this purpose the paper proposes and estimates an indicator of trade 
integration, the so-called border effect or home bias. Second, it assesses the 
connection between trade integration and FDI flows within the EU. The home bias is 
the effect whereby consumers prefer domestic to foreign goods of similar 
characteristics. Its presence in even highly integrated areas has been regarded as 
one of the six major puzzles in international economics (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001). 
The path breaking contribution of Mccallum (1995), which used a gravity model as 
his framework of analysis and found a substantial degree of home bias in the 
Canadian-USA trade, was followed by other pieces of research covering OCDE 
countries (Wei, 1996, 1998), the EU (Nitsch, 2000; Chen, 2004; Quian, 2007) and the 
border effect between the regions that encompass specific countries (Combes et al., 
2005; Gil Pareja et al., 2005; Wolf, 2009; Llano et al., 20011; Esteban et al., 2012. 
The size of the home bias, as documented by these and other papers, is still a 
matter of controversy, and according to some authors (Helliwell, 1998; Anderson and 
Wincoop, 2003; Liu et al., 2010) it is heavily contingent upon the methodology 
employed for its estimation and the variables included. Wei (1996, 1998) found a 
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home bias of 10 for the OCDE countries whereas Nitsch reported a value of 11.3 for 
EU countries.  
Econometric analyses of this issue have become more sophisticated over time. 
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have replaced the original log linear estimations of 
the gravity model by an equation in multiplicative form and propose Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood estimation (PPML). This approached has also been used by 
Llano et al (2011), while Dias (2010, 2011) employs a non linear specification.  
The literature has not reached a consensus yet on the sign of the connection 
between trade and FDI. On a priori grounds, it is reasonable to assert that trade and 
FDI are alternative ways of serving a foreign market, thus the correlation being 
negative. As a matter of fact, some early empirical studies highlighted the existence 
of a substitution relationship between trade and FDI (Mundell, 1957, Graham, 1996; 
Bayoumi and Lipworth, 1997; Nakamura and Oyama, 1998). Contrarily to this view, 
though, other contributions argue that FDI and trade are complements rather than 
substitutes (Pfaffermayer, 1996; Brainard, 1997; Brenton et al, 1999; 
Balasubramanyam et al, 2002, Egger and Pfaffermayer, 2004a, 2004b; Cuadros et 
al, 2004; Alguacil et al, 2008; Neary, 2009; Martinez et al, 2012a). Furthermore, 
another group o papers has found both types of relationship, of complementarity and 
of substitution, between trade and FDI (Goldberg and Klein, 1999; Blonigen, 2001, 
Head and Ries, 2001, Swenson, 2004; Fillat-Castejón et al, 2008). These authors 
find that trade and FDI are complements in aggregate terms whereas depending on 
the industry analysed, they can behave either as substitutes or complements. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of our 
conceptual framework along with a brief summary of the data and the empirical 
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specifications considered in this paper. We report our findings in the third section and 
conclude with policy implications and possible extensions. 
 
2. EMPIRICS 
2.1. GRAVITY MODEL 
The gravity equation applied to trade, in its simplest form (Tinbergen, 1962) 
states that the volume of trade between any two countries is positively correlated with 
the economic volumes of the exporter and importer countries and negatively 
associated with natural or artificial trade resistance (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 
1985; Deardorff, 1998; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). In addition, this 
framework is also appropriate to estimate FDI models (Eaton and Tamura, 1996; 
Graham, 1996; Brenton et al, 1999). 
According to Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), the gravity equation for trade is 






      (1) 
 
where  measures exports from the exporter i country to the importer j country in 
year .  and  are the gross domestic product of the exporter and importer 
countries.  is the world GDP.  stands for the bilateral trade barrier between 
country  and country . Price indices  and  are, in the terminology of Anderson 
and Van Wincoop (2003),  “multilateral resistance” variables since they depend on all 
bilateral resistances . The authors caution that these multilateral resistances may 
not be observable and therefore cannot be interpreted more generally as consumer 
price indices.  
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Analogous to the gravity equation for trade showed above, a similar expression 
for FDI can be derived directly from economic theory. In effect, theoretical 
foundations for the gravity equation applied to FDI can be found, among others, in 
Brainard (1997), Markusen and Maskus (2002), Bergstrand and Egger (2007), and 
Kleinert and Toubal (2010). 
The gravity equations for FDI considered in this paper are the ones proposed by 
Kleinert and Toubal (2010) for the horizontal and vertical models respectively: 
 
 =  ! "!#     (2) 
 
where  measures the aggregate sales of foreign affiliates1 from  firms  in year 
.  is the home country’s supply capacity and # is the host country ’s market 
capacity. Distance costs, , are an increasing function of geographical distance 
between  and   with  being unit distance costs and $ > 0. 
 
 = ' 1 − *! + ,- ⁄ /0, 1 121	⁄3 323	⁄     (3) 
 
where  measures the aggregate sales of foreign affiliates from  firms  in year . 
,- ⁄  is a function of the income ratio, 0  is a function of distance costs, and 
, 1 121	⁄3 323	⁄  is a function of relative factor endowment ratio between country  and 
country . 
 
                                                          
1
 Although this specification of the gravity model is intended to analyse sales of foreign affiliates, it also may be 




The OECD in their Structural Analysis Dataset (STAN) and International Direct 
Investment database provides data on bilateral exports and bilateral foreign direct 
investment, respectively. Disaggregated bilateral exports data is measured in current 
US dollars for each of the 23 industries considered while FDI data is provided on 
aggregate bases and also measured in current US dollars. The GDPs in real terms 
and US dollars are taken from the National Accounts Dataset provided by the OECD. 
Bilateral trade flows and FDI series have been deflated using the GDPs deflactors 
taken from the National Accounts Dataset as well. 
In order to account for the “countries’ imports from themselves” data, which are 
necessary to estimate the home bias effect, we have followed Wei (1996) computing 
this variable for each industry and country as the difference between total production 
of goods and exports to the rest of the world. Data on these variables have been also 
extracted from the STAN Datasets and deflated using GDPs deflactors. 
Data provided by the Centre d´Etudes Prospectives et d´Informations 
Internationals (CEPII) is used to account for bilateral and intra-national distances and 
also to account for adjacency and language dummies. Bilateral geodesic distances 
are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes 
of the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) in each country. 
The internal distance of a country, which is a proxy of the average distance between 
producer and consumers in a country is calculated using the area-based formula 
proposed by Head and Mayer (2002)2. Language variable takes value 1 if two 
                                                          
2    = 0.67789:;<  
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countries share the same official language, adjacency variable measure whether two 
countries are contiguous –share land border–. 
Relative factor endowments, needed to estimate the FDI models, have been 
constructed using data on skilled3 and total employment from the Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics published by the international labour organization (ILO). 
Other variables such as the Corruption Perception Index or Trade Freedom 
Indices are provided by Transparency International and The Heritage Foundation 
respectively. 
 
2.3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the first part of this section, to estimate the border effect by means of a gravity 
equation, data on bilateral trade for 23 sectors of activity among 19 European 
countries4 over the period 1995 to 2009 has been used. We follow Gourieroux, et al. 
(1984a, 1984b) and Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to estimate a Poisson 
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood model (PPML). This estimation technique is robust to 
different patterns of heteroskedasticity and provides a natural way to deal with zeros 
in our data5. 
The standard log-linear specification of the gravity model has important 
disadvantages over a non-linear specification. Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
show that in the presence of heteroskedasticity in the error term, the parameters of 
                                                          
3 Skilled employment is defined as the sum of occupational categories 1 (legislators, senior officials 
and managers), 2 (professionals) and 3 (technicians and associate professionals) from the ISCO-88 
classification. 
4 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg (considered jointly), Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
5 Panel dataset has 111,780 observations (23-sectors x 18-exporting countries x 18-importing 
countries x 15-years) of which 4,463 are zero. 
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log-linearized models estimated by OLS lead to biased estimations of the true 
elasticities since the log-linearization of the dependent variable changes the 
properties of the error term, which becomes correlated with the explanatory variables 
in the presence of heteroskedasticity (the Jensen’s inequality). In addition, log-
linearization is not compatible with the presence of zero values in the dependent 
variable. Empirically, the PPML method estimates the parameters by entering the 
dependent variable in levels while the independent ones are expressed in natural 
logarithms.  
Thus, the gravity equation for trade to be estimated is as follows: 
 
= = >? + > ln ! + >- ln + >B ln + >C + >D EF#G! + 
+	$ + $ + $= + $ + I=        (4) 
 
where: = are the k-sector bilateral exports from country  to country   in year .  
and  are the GDPs of countries	 and , respectively.  stands for the bilateral 
trade barrier between country  and country  (the bilateral distance) and  captures 
different characteristics of exporter and importer countries such as sharing a 
common language or land border, being an island or landlocked. EF#G is a dummy 
variable which takes value 1 for intra-national trade and 0 otherwise. 
Additionally, the model includes origin and destination ($, $) as well as industry 
and time ($=, $) fixed effects in order to account for the unobserved price indices or 
“multilateral resistance” mentioned by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)6. I= 
refers to the error term. 
                                                          
6 Since the multilateral resistance terms are not observable, it is common practice to use importer and 
exporter fixed effects to replace the resistance terms; an approach that according to Feenstra (2002) 
gives consistent estimates and is easy to implement. 
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On an a priori basis, bilateral exports from country  to country  are supposed to 
show a positive relation with the economic sizes of both countries; as well as sharing 
special characteristics such as language or a common land border are supposed to 
reduce transaction costs and consequently foster bilateral trade. The bilateral 
distance between them should act as a barrier to trade so it should exhibit a negative 
sign.  
For the purpose of this paper, the key parameters in equation (4) are those 
corresponding to the dummy for EF#G since we can recover yearly border effects 
from their point estimates. The exponential of the coefficient of EF#G, is the ratio of 
intra-national trade to international trade for certain year, country or industry, after 
controlling for size of GDP, distance, language, adjacency…7 Therefore, small 
estimates for the home dummies indicate a lower relative weight of intra-national 
trade and thus an increase in the importance of international trade in the countries, 
industries or years of the sample, i.e., greater trade integration. 
The next step is to test whether trade integration, measured as the inverse of the 
evolution of home bias, is correlated with FDI. In order to do so, we construct a trade 
integration variable based on the previously estimates of home bias. Firstly we 
normalize the home bias estimates (equalizing 1995’s to one). The reason for doing 
this is to eliminate the size of the estimates since it depends crucially on the measure 
of intra-national distances used in the estimation (see Wei (1996) for a very good 
example). Once we have normalized the coefficients, we calculate their inverse to 
obtain our measure of trade integration (JKG,LM!.  
                                                          
7
 See, among others, McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1996), Wei (1996), Nitsch (2000), Wolf (2009), Chen (2004) 
and Liu et al. (2010) for further explanation. 
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By means of the estimation of the gravity models for FDI presented in equations 
(2) and (3) we may now test Trade-FDI relationship. Analogous to the earlier case a 
PPML model is used (Kleinert and Toubal, 2010). 
The gravity equations for FDI to be estimated are as follows: 
 
NJ = O + > ln ! + >- ln + >B ln + >C ln JKG,LM! +  
+	$ + $ + $ + I         (5) 
 
NJ = O + > ln ! + >- ln + >B ln + >C ln JKG,LM! +  
+	>D ln +  + >PQNR + $ + $ + $ + I     (6) 
 
where: NJ are the bilateral investment flows from country  to country   in year  in 
real terms.  and  are the GDPs of countries	 and , respectively.  stands 
for the bilateral distance between home and host countries. JKG,LM is the previously 
constructed trade integration variable and QNR is the relative factor endowment 
ratio, defined as SK  + ⁄  − SKT T + T⁄ . Additionally, the model 
includes origin, destination and time ($, $, $) fixed effects. I= refers to the error 
term. 
According to Kleinert and Toubal (2010) equation (5) is derived from the 
horizontal FDI models while equation (6) refers to the vertical FDI model. The 
horizontal models predict the coefficients for home and host country GDP to be one 
and the distance coefficient (>B) to be negative. Meanwhile, vertical models predict 
the coefficient of the sum of the GDPs (>D) and the coefficient > (home GDP) to be 
negative and >- (host GDP) to be positive. Distance coefficient is predicted to be 





3.1. GRAVITY MODEL FOR TRADE 
The study of the evolution of the average home bias over the period considered 
can offer very important insights about the change in intra-European trade openness 
and may be used to evaluate the performance of the Single Market and the effects of 
the new internal trade liberalization policies. If border effects decline over time, it 
means that intra-national trade becomes less important relative to international trade 
and, therefore, that preference for domestically produced goods as opposed to 
foreign ones declines along the period considered–other things equal–. This analysis 
could be considered as a measure of commercial integration (Qian, 2007; Martinez et 
al, 2012b). 
 Table 1 reports the estimates using different specifications of the gravity 
equation (4). The first column exhibits the standard gravity equation where the 
economic size of exporter and importer countries and the distance between them are 
considered. Column two includes dummy variables for adjacency and language 
respectively to capture the transaction costs. In the last two columns other dummies 
are included to denote the effects on bilateral trade depending on being an island or 
landlocked, either for the exporter and importer countries.  
As shown in Table 1, in all specifications, the basic gravity explanatory variables 
are highly significant and the coefficients have the expected signs. The GDP 
coefficients are positive, distance has a negative effect on trade flows, language and 
adjacency estimates are positive, this is, sharing a common language or border 
promote trade by reducing transaction costs. Finally, island and landlocked show 
different point estimates (sign) and significance levels when time fixed effects are 
included in addition to origin-year and destination-year fixed effects. A priori 
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expectations for these coefficients are not straightforward; on the one hand, being an 
island or landlocked reduce potential exports due to transport limitations. On the 
other hand, they may raise bilateral exports due to the increase in the multilateral 
resistances. Results obtained are not conclusive in this regards since coefficients 
vary in sign and significance across specifications. These changes may be due to the 
fact that only 2 countries out of 19 (Ireland and the United Kingdom) are islands and 
solely 4 out of 19 are landlocked (Austria, Czech Rep., Hungary and Slovakia). 
Moreover, except for the United Kingdom, their economic size and their relative 
commercial proportion are small. 
In order to retrieve the border effect from the estimations we should calculate the 
exponential of the point estimate of the EF#G variable. That is, taking forth column 
and year 2009 (EF#G-??U = 2.689), on average, a European country traded 14.7 
times (exp^ 2.689!		= 14.71) more with itself than with another European partner. 
According to the estimations presented in table 1, the average overall border 
effect shows a net increase of around 3% from 1995 to 2009 for the EU-19 countries 
(see table 2). Point estimates for the border effects in column 1 show lower values 
than in the rest of columns; however, since this is a very basic model where some 
relevant variables are omitted, those coefficients may be biased. Once dummy 
variables are included, and different fixed effects are considered, the border effects 








TABLE 1. GRAVITY EQUATION FOR TRADE WITH YEARLY BORDER EFFECTS. 
VARIABLES (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Ln (Yi) 1.000 ** (0.064) 1.049 ** (0.082) 1.203 ** (0.070) 1.201 ** (0.064) 
Ln (Yj) 1.099 ** (0.061) 1.156 ** (0.072) 1.284 ** (0.075) 1.144 ** (0.083) 
Ln (Distij) -1.389 ** (0.017) -0.941 ** (0.021) -0.9360 ** (0.021) -0.971 ** (0.022) 
Adjacency    0.554 ** (0.033) 0.596 ** (0.032) 0.594 ** (0.034) 
Common Language   1.031 ** (0.039) 1.018 ** (0.039) 1.040 ** (0.040) 
Islandi     1.779 ** (0.212) -1.349 ** (0.168) 
Islandj       -2.597 ** (0.288) -0.530 * (0.239) 
Landlockedi       2.598 ** (0.174) 0.476 * (0.191) 
Landlockedj     -2.340 ** (0.269) -2.966 ** (0.311) 
Home 1995 1.720 ** (0.064) 2.623 ** (0.071) 2.626 ** (0.071) 2.667 ** (0.093) 
Home 1996 1.864 ** (0.058) 2.776 ** (0.066) 2.741 ** (0.066) 2.757 ** (0.068) 
Home 1997 1.947 ** (0.058) 2.858 ** (0.066) 2.818 ** (0.066) 2.835 ** (0.068) 
Home 1998 1.941 ** (0.060) 2.848 ** (0.067) 2.811 ** (0.067) 2.825 ** (0.069) 
Home 1999 1.973 ** (0.060) 2.878 ** (0.067) 2.844 ** (0.067) 2.862 ** (0.069) 
Home 2000 2.053 ** (0.060) 2.959 ** (0.067) 2.916 ** (0.067) 2.935 ** (0.069) 
Home 2001 2.079 ** (0.062) 2.979 ** (0.069) 2.975 ** (0.069) 2.997 ** (0.071) 
Home 2002 2.043 ** (0.062) 2.951 ** (0.069) 2.909 ** (0.069) 2.928 ** (0.070) 
Home 2003 1.879 ** (0.061) 2.786 ** (0.068) 2.743 ** (0.068) 2.760 ** (0.070) 
Home 2004 1.766 ** (0.063) 2.671 ** (0.069) 2.631 ** (0.069) 2.654 ** (0.071) 
Home 2005 1.719 ** (0.063) 2.631 ** (0.069) 2.588 ** (0.069) 2.602 ** (0.071) 
Home 2006 1.667 ** (0.064) 2.580 ** (0.071) 2.539 ** (0.070) 2.554 ** (0.072) 
Home 2007 1.592 ** (0.064) 2.484 ** (0.071) 2.474 ** (0.070) 2.479 ** (0.072) 
Home 2008 1.627 ** (0.078) 2.510 ** (0.083) 2.503 ** (0.082) 2.508 ** (0.084) 
Home 2009 1.758 ** (0.080) 2.649 ** (0.083) 2.664 ** (0.082) 2.689 ** (0.084) 
# Observations 109,932  109,953  109,881  109,400  
R2 0.881  0.882  0.883  0.882  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is the real bilateral 
exports from country i to country j. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** denote 
significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Industry fixed effects and year-specific exporter and 
importer fixed effects are included in all the regressions (Feenstra, 2002). The last column also 
includes time fixed effects. 
 
In all the specifications a very similar pattern arises for the border effect 
estimates and three stages may be easily identified. In a first stage they show 
increasingly higher values until 2001. A second period, from 2002 to 2007 is 
characterised by a sharp decline in border effects. Finally, the border effect increases 
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again in the last two years of analysis. Up to 2001, border effects increase by around 
40 per cent in the EU; while there seems to be a commercial integration for the 
period from 2001 to 2007, when the decline averages, again, the 40%. The increase 
in the last two years goes from 18 to 23 per cent, being especially important in 2009 
when the border effect increased by 14 to 19 per cent from the previous year 
depending on the specification considered. 
 
TABLE 2. ESTIMATED BORDER EFFECTS. 
YEAR  \  ESTIMATION (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1995 5.58 13.78 13.68 14.40 
1996 6.45 16.05 15.50 15.75 
1997 7.01 17.43 16.74 17.03 
1998 6.97 17.25 16.63 16.86 
1999 7.19 17.78 17.18 17.50 
2000 7.79 18.71 18.47 18.82 
2001 8.00 19.67 19.59 20.03 
2002 7.71 19.13 18.34 18.69 
2003 6.55 16.22 15.53 15.80 
2004 5.85 14.45 13.89 14.21 
2005 5.58 13.89 13.30 13.49 
2006 5.30 13.20 12.67 12.86 
2007 4.91 11.99 11.87 11.93 
2008 5.09 12.30 12.21 14.28 
2009 5.80 14.14 14.45 14.72 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: Estimated Border Effects are calculated as the exponential of the β-estimates for the home 
variables in table 1 exp^ EF#G!. Columns are presented in the same order as in table 1. 
 
Results obtained from the evolution of the border effects are in line with the 
evolution of the intra-European trade openness rate (figure 1). We have calculated 
the intra-European trade openness rate as the weighted-average of the countries 
openness rate with the rest of countries in the sample, using countries’ GDP 
participation as weight. Border effects from the third and fourth columns of table 1 
have been included in the figure. 
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From 1995 to 2002 we observe a decline in the openness rate. This decline is 
due to the fact that although exports and imports grew in those years they evolved at 
a slower pace than GDP. This period corresponds to greater border effects. From 
2002 to 2008 the situation turned around, intra-European trade grew faster than 
GDPs and the openness rate experienced a large growth from 27% of GDP in 2002 
to more than 45% in 2008. The border effect, meanwhile, faced a decline of around 
40% –from 20, to 12 in 2007–. Finally, intra-European trade experienced a sharp 
decline between 2008 and 2009 reflected in a decline of the openness rate by 10 
points. As shown in figure 1, the estimated border effects follow an opposite pattern 
that intra-European openness rate. This is the case for the whole period except for 
year 2008 when the openness rate was still growing while the border effects, instead 
declining, started to raise as well. 
 
FIGURE 1. YEARLY BORDER EFFECTS AND INTRA-EUROPEAN TRADE OPENNESS. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data on exports, imports and GDP are from the OECD. Border Effects 


























































Intra-European Openness Rate Border Effects (Est. 3) Border Effects (Est. 4)
17 
 
Once the border effects have been estimated, the next stage is to construct our 
commercial integration variable. As it was mentioned above, this is a two steps 
process; firstly, we normalized the border effects by doing 1995’s equals to one. 
Then, we compute the inverse to obtain the integration variable. By means of these 
transformations we avoid the possibility of a size bias (Wei, 1996) and we get a 
variable easily interpretable. Table 3 details the home bias results from column 4 in 
table 1 and shows how the commercial integration variable has been constructed as 
stated above. 
 
TABLE 3. ESTIMATED BORDER EFFECTS AND COMMERCIAL INTEGRATION.  
Year 
Border  Annual Rate of Growth Normalized ^_``abcdef 
Effect 
Gg >h! 








1995 14.39 -- -- 1 1 
1996 15.75 9.42 9.42 1.09 0.92 
1997 17.03 8.11 18.29 1.18 0.85 
1998 16.86 -0.99 17.12 1.17 0.85 
1999 17.50 3.77 21.53 1.22 0.82 
2000 18.82 7.57 30.73 1.31 0.76 
2001 20.03 6.40 39.10 1.39 0.72 
2002 18.69 -6.67 29.82 1.30 0.77 
2003 15.80 -15.46 9.75 1.10 0.91 
2004 14.21 -10.058 -1.29 0.99 1.01 
2005 13.49 -5.07 -6.29 0.94 1.06 
2006 12.86 -4.69 -10.68 0.89 1.12 
2007 11.93 -7.23 -17.14 0.83 1.20 
2008 12.28 2.94 -14.70 0.85 1.18 
2009 14.72 19.84 2.22 1.02 0.98 
Source: Own elaboration. 






For the purpose of this paper we have also addressed the border effect issue 
from a country point of view by estimating the country-specific evolution of the home 
bias over the period considered. Estimated border effects and commercial integration 
variables for each country are presented in table A2 and figure A1 in the appendix8. 
 
3.2. GRAVITY MODEL FOR FDI. THE TRADE-FDI NEXUS 
We analyse the impact of intra-European trade integration on the bilateral FDI 
flows within the nineteen European countries using the gravity model specifications 
discussed above. Tentatively figures A2 and A3 in the appendix show the correlation 
between commercial integration, computed as the inverse of the border effects 
estimates, and FDI inflows and outflows respectively. More specifically, FDI for a 
reporting country accounts for the logarithm of the aggregate flows to/from the rest of 
the European countries in the sample. Both figures suggest a positive relationship 
between FDI and Commercial Integration. Thus, we may expect a priori positive 
estimates for the integration variables in the estimation of the gravity model for FDI. 
The results of these regressions are presented in table 4. The results presented 
in columns 1 and 3 correspond to the horizontal model shown in equation (5). 
Estimates regarding home and host GDP are in line with earlier results from gravity 
equations and are significant at 1% level. However, the horizontal (proximity-
concentration) model suggests that the coefficients on both GDP variables should be 
equal to one. Yet, this is not supported by the data. The restriction on both 
coefficients equals to unity is rejected at the 1% level in columns 1 and 3.  We have 
included the corruption perception index (CPI) from Transparency International as a 
control variable. We do find significant impact of this index –for the host country– on 
                                                          
8
 Complete estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
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bilateral FDI flows. Higher CPI scores means less perception of corruption. This 
significant impact highlights the sensitiveness of investors to corruption, even among 
the European Union where countries are supposed to score good corruption indexes. 
 
TABLE 4. GRAVITY EQUATION FOR FDI.  
VARIABLES (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
ln (Yi) 0.644 ** (0.077) 1.033 ** (0.194) 0.572 ** (0.076) 0.746 ** (0.162) 
ln (Yj) 0.617 ** (0.083) 0.987 ** (0.164) 0.583 ** (0.087) 0.742 ** (0.154) 
ln (Distij) -1.289 ** (0.134) -1.213 ** (0.134) -0.813 ** (0.108) -0.804 ** (0.102) 
EU Integration 1.904 * (0.829) 1.870 * (0.842)       
Integrationi       0.525 ** (0.085) 0.494 ** (0.086) 
Integrationj       0.267 ** (0.076) 0.259 ** (0.076) 
ln (Yi + Yj)    -0.816 * (0.354)    -0.751 * (0.294) 
RFEij    2.082 * (0.821)    0.627  (0.589) 
CPIj 0.254 ** (0.043) 0.307 ** (0.043) 0.189 ** (0.045) 0.209 ** (0.047) 
# Observations 3030   3030   3030   3030   
R2 0.285   0.283   0.344   0.344   
Test ln(Yi)=ln(Yj)=1 52.91 **  0.10   129.56 **  3.27   
p-value (0.000)   (0.949)   (0.000)   (0.195)   
Test ln(Yi+Yj)=1    26.25 **     35.82 **  
p-value    (0.000)      (0.000)   
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is the real bilateral 
FDI flows from country i to country j. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** denote 
significantly different from 0 at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Home country, host country and time 
fixed effects are included in all the regressions. 
 
We include the relative factor endowment (QNR) and the sum of GDPs variables 
in columns 2 and 4. The introduction of these two variables accounts for the vertical 
FDI model (factor-proportions model) presented in equation (6). Again, as in columns 
1 and 3, GDP and distance variables remain unchanged regarding sign and 
significance level as well as the corruption variable. The vertical model predicts that 
the coefficient for the sum of GDPs to be one; this particular is rejected by the data at 
the 1% level of significance since coefficients obtained shows a negative and 
significant relationship. The prediction of the vertical model regarding to relative 
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factor endowments is that FDI should increase in the high-skilled labour abundance 
of the home country, relative to the host country. Evidence from the data is mixed 
and inconclusive. While it may exert a positive impact in specification (2), 
specification (4) shows a coefficient not significantly different form zero. In the case 
of the European countries, home and host economic structures and human capital 
endowments are quite similar so it is understandable that this measure will show 
mixed evidence for this group of countries. 
Finally and what is more interesting for the purpose of this paper, commercial 
integration variables are included in all the regressions to account for the Trade-FDI 
nexus. In column 1 and 3 the average commercial integration is suggested while in 
columns 2 and 4 we consider the home and host country trade integration variables 
separately. Results indicate a complementary relationship between intra-European 
trade and FDI. This result is supported by the data in the four specifications 
considered. The estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant at 5% 
in the cases of the average commercial integration variable. The evidence from the 
home and host country variables is even stronger. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical analysis carried out in this paper states that commercial 
integration, captured by the evolution of the home bias, and FDI within the European 
Union during 1995-2009 exhibit a positive correlation, thus displaying a relationship 
of complementarity. The results also point out that cost differentials, for the country 
sample considered, are not as relevant as the possibility of gaining market share.  
The gravity equation for trade points out a positive and decreasing, up to 2007, 
border effect, which means that in spite of the establishment of the Single Market Act 
21 
 
there is still a bias in favor of domestic goods. This bias, in the case of the EU, is 
probably caused by informal trade barriers, features related to marginal propensity to 
consume and the degree of substitution between goods. 
Our findings support the idea that policies targeted to promote further 
consolidations of the European Single Market –removing informal trade barriers, 
promoting liberalization and reducing bureaucracy–, may have positive effects, not 
only regarding the commercial performance of the EU but also helping to intensify 
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FIGURE A1. BORDER EFFECT AND INTRA-EUROPEAN OPENNESS RATE EVOLUTION 
Austria Belgium-Luxembourg Czech Republic Denmark Finland 
     
France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland 
     
Italy Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovakia 
     
Spain Sweden United Kingdom  
   
Notes: Solid lines account for the country’s intra-European Openness Rate while 
the dotted ones represent the estimated border effect. Left vertical axes are the 
reference for the openness rate (in percentage). Right vertical axes are the scale 
for the border effect. 
Data on exports, imports and GDP are from the OECD. Border Effects have been 
estimated by means of the gravity equation. 
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FIGURE A2. INWARD FDI FROM EU-19 AND COMMERCIAL INTEGRATION 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
FIGURE A3. OUTWARD FDI TO EU-19 AND COMMERCIAL INTEGRATION 
 



























































Commercial Integration (Inverse Log [Border Effect]) 
POL (97,01)
POL (95,96)
SLO (00)
SLO (01)
SLO (02)
CZE (00)
HOL (08)
BEL (08)
